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INTRODUCTION: ELEMENTS IN AN APPROACH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
Three areas for constructive work on human development are much discussed: what are 
the values which should define and guide human development; what are causes and 
barriers for human development; and how can we operationalize a theorised approach 
(a package of concepts, values, and explanatory theories) in terms of measurement, 
instruments and policy priorities. There are also three less discussed but essential 
counterpart areas of work. First, operationalization requires not just measurement but 
institutionalization, including establishing and sustaining a programme of research for 
action, and attracting and keeping the support of a body of researchers and potential 
users. Second, an ongoing research and policy programme of human development, and 
action on its findings, requires a basis of widespread public commitment and concern. 
Lastly, without rich observation and evidence, each of the required commitment, 
concern, ethical theory and positive theory are likely to be weak and insufficient. Table 
1 highlights these six areas. 
 
Table 1: Essential areas for work on human development 
 
MUCH DISCUSSED AREAS VITAL ADDITIONAL AREAS 
 
Ethical Theory 
 
Positive Knowledge on: 
Causes 
Requisites 
Constraints 
Effects 
 
‘Operationalization’: 
Measurement 
Prioritization 
Implementation 
 
 
Mobilization and Sustaining of Public and 
Private Concern and Commitment 
 
Rich Observation and Evidence  
(including of the lives and thoughts of deliberating 
human subjects, in their diverse concreteness, 
complexity, and individual specificity) 
 
Institutionalization, including through 
stimulating and maintaining a research and 
policy programme(s) 
 Cooperative network of researchers and users, 
with resources and morale, sustained by: 
 Judicious strategy and tactics 
 
 A theory of human development needs thus to be more than only a theory in 
welfare economics or ethics. Amartya Sen’s capability approach arose in response to 
the question of what is the appropriate space for evaluating people’s advantage and the 
distribution of advantages (‘equality of what?’). A human development theory or 
approach has further purposes besides evaluation and so requires additional types of 
information. Sen has extended his capability approach considerably, notably in 
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Development as Freedom, but it retains a welfare economics imprint. A human 
development theory should preferably be helpful in other roles too: including for 
understanding behaviour and explaining agency and satisfactions; for mobilization of 
attention, concern and commitment; and for guidance in the processes of formulating,  
making and implementing public choices.  
 Martha Nussbaum’s special quality has been to give an overall vision of human 
development which adds depth in most of these connected areas, not only the 
evaluation and measurement of advantages and their distribution. We will see how she 
enriches attention to the ‘human’ in thinking about ‘human development’, through her 
treatments of the centrality of human emotions, affiliations and communication. Her 
publications since 1999 considerably strengthen and enrich her contribution, though 
retaining some perhaps questionable features. I will look especially at her formulations 
in Women and Human Development and Creating Capabilities, but with supplementary 
reference to Sex and Social Justice, Upheavals of Thought, and The Clash Within, as 
well as at Poetic Justice’s statement of her methodological perspective, since these 
other books remain neglected in the international development studies literature.  
 The paper has the following main parts. A short first part addresses the 
relationship between purposes and methods in ethics. It distinguishes various foci or 
arenas in ethical and ethics-related discourse, and examines some corresponding 
methods. This sets the stage. 
 The second part presents Nussbaum’s work in ethical theory, including her 
priority capabilities list, as part of an overall approach to development ethics, including 
ethics-related observation and practice. We will look at each of the major areas we 
highlighted in Table 1, not only at abstracted theoretical ethics. We make a detailed 
comparison with Sen’s capability approach, and see its somewhat different purposes 
and correspondingly different methods. We identify and review major debates around 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and how the revised and deepened version 
published since 1999 responds to earlier comments. 
 The paper’s third and fourth parts examine Nussbaum’s recommended methods. 
Centrally, we consider her advocacy of the use of imaginative and other idiographic 
literature, including for deepening understanding and building concern and sympathy 
for persons; and of the analysis and use of emotions, with special reference to 
compassion. We consider also the broader principles, of engagement with a wide range 
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of evidence, including personalized accounts, and of ‘internal criticism’, i.e. 
conversation with a cultural tradition by drawing on its own internal resources. We will 
consider the methods’ rationales, how far Nussbaum follows the principles, and how far 
she could open up to further types of evidence, collaboration, and interaction.  
 In effect, the paper examines logos, ethos and pathos—the three elements of 
persuasion recognized by classical Greek rhetoric: logos (reasoning), pathos (the felt 
experience which a discourse draws on and the feelings it evokes), and ethos (including 
the degree of confidence, mutual respect and authority which the author establishes in 
relation to the audience)—in Nussbaum’s work on human development.  
 
1. DIVERSE STAGES IN PRACTICAL DISCOURSE REQUIRE DIVERSE METHODS 
 
The more types of purpose one has, the more types of evidence, conceptualization and 
theorization one must use. Consider a series of stages or foci in practical ethics:- exposure 
to real cases; trying to grasp and interpret them using readily available ‘everyday’ ideas; 
trying to build general concepts or theory, if and when felt necessary; returning to analyse 
real cases using such tools from theory; and making and acting on practical choices. More 
simply we might refer to three broad stages: induction, theorization, and decision-
making/action. These different purposes and stages of thought are found to involve 
different styles of case-use and argumentation (Gasper 2000a).  
 Induction involves reflecting on experiences of real people, preferably through 
striking, absorbing, accessible examples. Cases can sensitize people to situations, 
issues, and ethical claims; build fellow-feeling; and convey notions about what is good. 
To do this they must be vivid, engrossing, and typically about real or plausible people. 
‘Constitutive narratives’ for example, says Benner, are stories which ‘exemplify 
positive notions about what is good’ (1991: 2), they convey core values within an area 
of practice and help to motivate and sustain its practitioners.  
 The immediacy and force of a story, a real case, outdoes any general statement. 
It contextualizes, and adds personal flavour and credibility. Anecdotes too, not only 
thick rich narratives, may do part of this and do so with great economy. Brief anecdotes 
give no answers, at least no reliable ones; but they can establish a felt connection and 
help to open hearts and minds. The Voices of the Poor study (e.g., Narayan et al. 2000) 
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lacks holistic narratives—people’s comments were processed and pigeonholed—but 
some of its quotations pierce like a knife. 
 Theorizing, whether theory-building or the ‘modelling’ of a particular case, 
typically calls for more abstracted thought, with exclusions and simplifications to allow 
systematic analysis of or with the remaining factors. Often excluded will be details 
about people which could distract the analyser and distort her analysis. Sometimes the 
cases considered are wholly imaginary.  
 The cases which are looked at to support decision-making and action should 
typically again be real and often detailed, to convey the complexity of contexts and to 
show, in ‘learning narratives’ (Benner 1991), the skills needed to act on values. Such 
stories bring emotions which are remembered too, which helps in later recall and 
activation of the skills, in action. We change our moral views especially by experiences 
which strongly involve our emotions, says Nussbaum. Ideally such emotions and 
stories, sometimes of inspiring personal exemplars, help to build commitment as well 
as skills.  
 This general principle that ethics and practical discourse include a variety of 
activities, which have distinct purposes and different appropriate methods, informs 
Nussbaum’s work. It lends the work unusual richness and insight. Her capabilities 
approach thus involves much more than a list of specific priorities in or for human 
lives. In a preliminary description, one could say that it also involves: 
 A wide-angle but focussed vision, looking at the content and potentials in key 
aspects of people’s lives, all people’s lives. Her list of priority capabilities fits here. 
 A way of looking, within the field of vision, with openness and sympathy. The list 
of priority capabilities embodies a basic theme: insistence on respect for all 
persons, as our starting point, from which culturally diverse interpretations and 
historically specific negotiations will proceed; rather than starting our public 
reasoning from whatever biased cultural and historical orderings hold sway. 
 Use of a wider range of evidence, including richer sources—fiction, poetry, auto-
biographies, and now also interviews and open-ended observation—than those used 
in economics and much other work on living standards.  
 A deeper way of understanding: using rich pictures of mind, personhood, emotions 
and language; and a richer style of presentation, that seeks to explore the human 
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content of evidence, including its emotional content, to build concern both for 
persons and for particular aspects of life. 
 Should all this be included when we consider Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach? Yes, if we are interested in what are the essential working parts of her 
approach to the ethics of human development. Furthermore we can see linkages within 
this set which suggest that it forms an interconnected package, not a priority 
capabilities list plus a bunch of quite separate features. While the others are not features 
that could only accompany a capabilities list, to specify and discuss her capabilities 
approach without them is artificial and misleading.  
 ‘The capabilities approach’ is an imperfect title then for this overall perspective 
on human development. ‘Capability approach’ was a fair description of Sen’s proposal 
for welfare economics: to adopt an alternative primary space for the accounting of well-
being or advantage, an alternative to utility or real income. When extending his work 
beyond welfare accounting Sen has employed other titles: ‘development as freedom’ or 
UNDP’s ‘human development’. Nussbaum used the label ‘Aristotelian social 
democracy’ in her earlier work, but outgrew that. ‘Cosmopolitan humanism’ might fit 
now, with perhaps ‘the capabilities approach’ as a secondary label to indicate the 
disaggregated perspective on people’s lives and the respect for their freedoms.1 Or one 
might focus on what the approach approaches, and speak of Nussbaum’s approach to 
the ethics of human development. Here however, just as Alkire (2002) uses the label 
‘capability approach’ to refer to Sen’s entire system, we may for simplicity refer to 
Nussbaum’s overall approach as her ‘capabilities approach’.2 
 Nussbaum’s approach attends to issues not covered in Sen’s, while his in turn 
contains purposes and aspects, such as measurement, not covered in hers. Sen has a 
stronger planning orientation or relevance; Nussbaum a stronger orientation to devising 
basic constitutional principles, as seen for example in Women and Human 
Development, and to citizen education, as in Poetic Justice, Cultivating Humanity, The 
Clash Within and Not for Profit.  
 
                                                 
1
 Creating Capabilities rejects a designation as cosmopolitan (p.92), when Nussbaum employs an 
extreme ‘comprehensive’ (p.93) definition of political cosmopolitanism: primary loyalty to humanity as a 
whole (as if a citizen of a world-state). The usage in this paper does fit Nussbaum: acceptance of the 
Stoic principles of equal dignity and substantial ethical concern for all of humanity, as in support for an 
extensive universal set of human rights.  
2
 Creating Capabilities notes concern for capabilities of animals as an additional reason for this label. 
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2. MAPPING NUSSBAUM'S CAPABILITIES APPROACH  
 
The evolution of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach since the early 1990s 
 
The WIDER research programme led by Sen and Nussbaum in the late 1980s and early 
1990s led to two noteworthy volumes, The Quality of Life and Women, Culture, and 
Development. These consolidated and extended ideas on what we should mean by 
improvement in the life of a person or group, and on how far are answers to such 
questions culturally relative. Nussbaum and Sen have espoused somewhat different 
positions. Some people find attractions in Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian capabilities 
ethic, compared to Sen’s thinner, more Kantian approach. Nussbaum gives a rich 
picture of what is a full human life; talks more in terms of real people, real life, not 
abstractions; and may thus be more able to reach wider or different ranges of people 
than only economists and analytic philosophers (Gasper 1997: 299). Yet, Nussbaum’s 
work from that period (Nussbaum 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b) often raised 
misgivings: ‘…a “top-table”, still too disciplinary, and emphatically Aristotelian style 
might bring not just substantive intellectual shortcomings, but antagonize others and 
thus short-circuit the debate it sought to advance’ (Gasper 1997: 300). 
 Nussbaum’s subsequent work, notably in Women and Human Development 
(WHD), has taken up the challenges voiced by many commentators. WHD gave a 
deeper, more measured, integrated and practical statement than in the earlier papers, 
which she rightly declared now to be superseded (e.g., 2000b: 103). Some major new 
areas of exposure and thought became apparent: an absorption in the hard practical 
reasoning of law, especially after her move from a department of classics to a law 
school; her adoption of a Rawlsian political liberalism which provides space for various 
comprehensive ethics rather than tries to enforce any one; and equally important, 
regular visits to India, partnered by considerable associated study.  
 Nussbaum’s approach takes human unity as the default case in ethics and adds 
variation where there is reason to do so, rather than starting by presuming difference 
and requiring us to prove commonality. She demonstrates in detail, in theory and by 
examples, how there is scope for cultural variation in operationalizing stipulated central 
capabilities and in life beyond them. She notes a series of channels for this (2000b: 
132): (i) the stipulation is of only a limited core set of priority capabilities, beyond 
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which there can be diversity; (ii) the core set includes liberties and choice; (iii) these 
priorities are stated only in general terms, and are (iv) to be then operationalized by 
local democratic processes; and (v) they are stated in terms of ensuring capabilities (as 
opportunities), rather than insisting on the corresponding functionings. Feature (i) 
marks the move away from her earlier advocacy for public policy of a more extensive 
and individualistic ethic. She now effectively incorporates insights from 
communitarianism, while avoiding relativism. 
 She thus makes clear her support for a ‘political’ rather than ‘comprehensive’ 
liberalism; and for an ‘overlapping consensus’ model (as argued for by many basic 
needs theorists; Braybrooke 1987, Gasper 1996, 2004). She focuses on specifying 
criteria of ‘a decent social minimum’ (2000a: 75), rather than a comprehensive list of 
proposed requirements for human flourishing; and on a limited set of more basic 
capabilities, not a long list of required functionings. Her early 1990s version had 
instead propounded criteria for, first, a life deemed ‘human’ rather than subhuman, and 
second, a life deemed a good human life. The newer version has a more useful 
intermediate focus, consistent with the advice of various commentators. 
 The ‘top table’, Aristotelian, combative, Northern feel has considerably 
declined. Aristotle remains a major influence, for reasons eloquently summarized in 
Creating Capabilities (2011: 125ff.), but no longer dominant. The primary self-
designation as Aristotelian has gone, reflecting awareness of its dangers and of her 
other affiliations, new and old, including to the Enlightenment and its aims of liberty 
and ‘a life enlightened by the critical use of reason’ (1999b: 2; see also 2000b: 103).  
 
General orientation and elements of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approaches 
 
To try to understand Nussbaum’s capabilities approach we can compare it with Sen’s 
work, with special reference to their mature versions, in Women and Human 
Development and in Sen’s synthetic statement Development as Freedom.3 Tables 2 and 
4 below offer a multi-part comparison, which can be outlined as follows: 
                                                 
3
 WHD offered a comparison (pp.11-15), but this was written prior to the appearance of Development as 
Freedom and drew some excessive contrasts. A powerful later paper by Nussbaum (2003) in effect 
compares the two books, with primary reference to the issue of specification of priority capabilities. 
Chapter 4 of Creating Capabilities adds further remarks. 
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A. General orientation: Sen and Nussbaum have substantially different audiences and 
so engage in different conversations.  
B. In terms of the intellectual tools they bring, Nussbaum employs a more elaborate 
theory of personhood.  
C. This difference is reflected in some of the elements of their capability approaches 
proper, including their concepts of capability, as we will see shortly.
4
 They differ 
too on the need for an indicative list of priority capabilities. We will see that this 
relates to the different sets of roles identified and adopted for their approaches.  
D. Concerning roles, both Nussbaum and Sen impressively span from review of 
experience, through building theoretical frameworks, to forging proposals for 
action. Nussbaum is more oriented to the additional roles of building engagement, 
concern and motivation. For questioning consumerism in rich countries, 
Nussbaum’s approach offers more too.  
E. Nussbaum uses a different, on the whole wider and richer, methodological ‘palette’, 
corresponding to her different conceptions of audience, personhood and roles.  
Some elements in the comparison will be familiar to many readers of Sen and 
Nussbaum and their major commentators (e.g. Crocker 2008, Alkire 2002; see also 
Gasper 1997, 2002, 2007a), especially within the first three aspects, and I will not 
attempt to discuss all the elements in detail here. The main purpose of the tables is 
instead to organize the comparison and to bring out some less familiar elements. 
Several of these concern roles and method, and will be presented in Table 4.  
                                                 
4
 Table 2C’s comparison uses the classification of components which I used in Gasper (2002, 2007a) to 
characterize Sen’s approach. 
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Table 2: First three parts of a comparison of the capability(/-ies) ethics of Sen and Nussbaum 
A. ORIENTATION SEN NUSSBAUM 
Main audience Economists, analytical philosoph-
ers, UNDP, World Bank &c. 
Literary philosophers, humanists, 
feminists, lawyers, civil society 
Style Politically safe: ‘cautious 
boldness, seeking a wide, 
mainstream audience with terms, 
tones and topics that will appeal 
[to] and engage them.’ (Gasper 
2000b: 996) 
Bold  
(though cautious in WHD on 
issues in India – e.g., Shah Bano 
case; but not so in The Clash 
Within)  
Attention to culture Limited Extensive 
Multi-cultural  Yes Has become multi-cultural (in 
relation to the contemporary 
world; was already so for literary 
and past worlds) 
Universalist 
/ relativist in ethics 
Universalist, with much space for 
variation.  
 
Universalist, with much space for 
variation.  
Head-on critique of relativism. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
PERSPECTIVES 
  
Normative 
individualism 
Yes Yes, ‘Principle of each person’s 
capability’: no one is expendable 
(Nussbaum 2000a:12), each 
should be treated as an end 
Theory of the 
person 
Less content: his picture includes 
reason and desires (plus ‘sympathy’ 
and ‘commitment’); but has less on 
meanings, or on the skills in 
reasoning, valuing, operating and 
co-operating. People are seen as 
reasoning choosers more than as 
full actors. 
Richer picture of thought, 
including emotions, and the 
influences on them. Stronger than 
Sen on interpreting meanings and 
action, including on uses of 
emotions.  
Emphasis on 
freedom 
Very high. Includes stress on the 
instrumental value of freedom, in 
addition to its independent value 
and its constructive value (i.e. role 
in building validated moral 
conclusions).  
Emphasis on freedom as choice and 
on ‘Development as Freedom’. 
Strong focus also on justice. 
Relatively little on care. 
High.
5
  
Less focus on behaviour in 
markets; more stress than Sen on 
law, emotional development, etc. 
Emphasis on freedom as self-
mastery? 
‘Development as Human Decency 
and Human Flourishing’. 
Strong focus on justice. 
Substantial attention also to care. 
   
                                                 
5
 Nussbaum can be as strong as Sen in the degree of normative priority she declares for capabilities 
(WHD, p.63, calls capabilities ‘the’, not ‘a’ relevant space for comparisons of quality of life; see also pp. 
87-8). This priority to capabilities is more plausible for prescription, and less often so for evaluation, 
where the case for attention to functionings is often high. She exaggerates the case against requiring 
certain functionings (such requirements are widespread, e.g. in road use; p.88), but elsewhere does note 
cases where mandatory functioning is justified (often for children, health, safety, and various duties; 
2000b: 130-1). Her principle of equal capability applies only up to the level of the decent minimum. Like 
Sen she certainly gives weight to other distributive principles too, as seen in her discussions of cases. 
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C. CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
COMPONENTS 
 
SEN 
 
NUSSBAUM 
1. Broad 
informational base 
Yes. A wide field of vision, looking 
at the contents of (all) people’s lives 
Yes; even wider 
2. A language 
(family of terms) 
Its main creator Partly shares this language, but 
partly modifies it. 
2a. Notion of 
functioning 
Highly generalized and abstract 
treatment 
More concrete, with attention to 
experiential content of some 
central functionings  
2b. Notion of 
‘capability’ / 
‘capabilities’ 
Undifferentiated, micro-economics 
influenced, theory-derived 
conception of ‘capability’: as 
opportunities  
Experience-derived, plural, 
phenomenological notions of 
‘capabilities’: as potentials, as 
skills, as opportunities  
2c. Well-being / 
agency 
Extensive use of this distinction, 
since he centrally argues with and 
against utilitarians 
Prefers categories less based on 
arguing with utilitarians (and 
which thus might sometimes half 
adopt their biases; Nussbaum 
2000a:14, 2011: 197 ff.) 
2d. ‘Sympathy’ / 
‘commitment’ 
These distinctions exemplify a well-
being/agency distinction, but Sen 
does not do much with them 
A major focus. Goes far deeper 
than Sen in this area, using more 
and other terms. 
3a. Moral priority 
to capabilities, in 
valuation 
Yes; proposed as the key ‘space’ for 
evaluation. Choice is presumed not 
to become oppressive. 
Yes 
3b. Moral priority 
to liberty 
Yes Yes, in that liberty is not to be 
traded away for more of other 
goods (2000a:12) 
4. Priority to 
capability, as a 
policy rule 
Yes  
[One can accept #4 without 
accepting #3, but not vice versa] 
Yes. This is consistent with 
Nussbaum’s focus on legal 
constitutions 
5 & 6: how to 
prioritize, 
including amongst 
capabilities   
5: by having ‘reason to value’. 
6: Sen points to public processes, 
calls for participation. 
5: Same as for Sen. 
6: Nussbaum focuses on processes 
in both the political and legal 
systems. 
7a. Priority 
capabilities list 
No explicit list. No clear 
‘Marxian/Aristotelian idea of truly 
human functioning’ (Nussbaum 
2000a:13). Sen is ambiguous here. 
Yes – but increasingly has 
presented own list as indicative of 
a prioritisation procedure and as 
open to local interpretation. 
7b. Link to human 
rights framework 
Now quite strongly linked (e.g. in 
Human Development Report 2000); 
but with doubts about treating rights 
as hard side-constraints (Nussbaum 
2000a:14) 
Capabilities approach as explicitly 
a human rights approach 
(Nussbaum 2006); ‘a basis for 
central constitutional principles’ 
(2000a:12). Basic rights are to 
threshold levels for priority 
capabilities. 
7c. Thresholds 
(prescriptive basic 
needs) 
Nussbaum suggests ‘Sen nowhere 
uses the idea of a threshold’  
(2000a:12). Rather, he sometimes 
uses it, but does not specify 
thresholds unilaterally. 
Priority goes to achieving basic 
threshold levels. This ranks above 
the expansion of opportunities 
beyond those levels for richer 
others. 
7d. Security Required for priority capabilities 
(CHS 2003) 
Required for priority capabilities 
(Nussbaum 2011: 145) 
 11  
Concepts of capability 
 A merit of Nussbaum’s version compared to Sen’s has been the distinctions she 
makes between types of capability, even though her labels may be questioned (Gasper 
1997 & 2002). She uses ‘basic capability’ to refer to undeveloped potentials; the label 
‘basic’ is, however, ambiguous and is often used by others normatively rather than, as 
here, positively. She uses ‘internal capability’ for developed skills; but ‘basic’ 
capabilities too are internal to people. Earlier she used the label of ‘external capability’ 
for the attainable options which people have (plain ‘capabilities’ in Sen’s informal 
usage) given their ‘internal capabilities’ and the relevant external conditions. Her newer 
label, ‘combined capability’, captures the relevance of both sets of factors but could 
bring misleading connotations too. And she uses ‘central capability’ for a priority-status 
attainable option, though again ‘central’ is an ambiguous term. The adjective ‘priority’ 
could be more transparent. Nussbaum does of course make a claim for the instrumental 
and normative centrality of the key capabilities that she lists. They are held to be valued 
in themselves, necessary features of being fully human, and instrumentally central for 
any life (2000a: 74). Table 3 sums up this set of terms, in comparison with Sen’s terms, 
everyday language, and a possible alternative set of labels. Whatever the labels are, 
Nussbaum helps us to think more clearly about four importantly different concepts. 
 
Figure 3: Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability concepts and labels 
 
 
 
Concept 1:  
An undeveloped 
human potential, 
skill, capacity 
Concept 2: 
A developed 
human potential, 
skill, capacity 
Concept 3:  
The attainable (set 
of valued) 
functioning(s), 
given a person’s 
skills and external 
conditions 
Concept 4: 
A priority for 
attainable (&/or 
achieved) 
functioning 
SEN’S LABEL  Capability 
(informal usage) 
Capability 
(formal usage) 
Basic capability 
(occasional usage) 
NUSSBAUM’S 
LABEL 
(2000a: 84) 
Basic capability; 
innate 
 
 
Internal capability 
Combined 
capability  
(earlier: external 
capability) 
Central capability. 
(Basic capability – 
an occasional 
usage; e.g. 1999a: 
87) 
ALTERNATIVE 
LABEL 
(Gasper 1997) 
P-capability 
(P for potential) 
S-capability 
(S for skill) 
O-capability, or 
option 
(O for option) 
Priority capability 
/ Basic need or 
basic right 
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The proposed list of priority capabilities 
 
Nussbaum’s exercise in theory building aims to identify a largely consensual or 
persuasive list of universal priority (opportunity-) capabilities. Why? She notes that the 
list is permanently open to debate and re-making, and to local interpretation and 
threshold-setting (e.g., thresholds are ‘set by internal political processes in each nation, 
often with the contribution of a process of judicial review’, 2001a: 418). So why try to 
personally specify such a list? The answers implied seem to be that without a 
highlighted indicative set of candidate entrenched priorities we leave too much open to 
self-interested interpretation by the powerful; and that Nussbaum seeks to convey a 
method of thinking, with principles of procedure and selection, for developing such a 
priority set. Rather than being an exercise in monological elite rule, such a priority list 
will suggest a starting point and ground for a bill of rights, part of a legal constitution. 
‘Human rights are, in effect, justified claims to such basic capabilities or opportunities’ 
(1999a: 87). Nussbaum’s greater emphasis previously on Aristotelianism than on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, plus other aspects of her earlier style, contributed 
to the still recurrent charges of elitism. 
 Her list highlights capacities and opportunities to choose. Some critics propose 
that it is illiberal to insist that people must have choice and the capacities for choice. 
But choice includes the option to choose a way of life which is without choice (within a 
religious order, for example). She provides examples of well-educated women who 
choose to wear a burka although not obliged to, and of some who make that choice 
after a period living without the burka; but who do not insist that others should be 
deprived of the choice and obliged to wear the burka (e.g., 2000a: 153). Similarly she 
gives striking examples of people celebrating their increased field of choice, such as 
thanks to literacy. 
 Nussbaum sometimes evinces optimism about convergence on a consensus core 
set of capabilities, and is surprisingly optimistic about the impacts of oppression on 
preferences and acceptance (e.g., ‘regimes that fail to deliver health, or basic security, 
or liberty are unstable’ – 2000a: 155). Are her views and proposed priorities really a 
wide consensus? While Gayatri Spivak (1999) for one suggests not, the priorities seem 
compatible with the huge Voices of the Poor study (Narayan et al., 2000). But her list in 
any case rests not primarily on current opinion polls, but on a proposed criterion of 
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prioritization and on the expectation that its results will converge with those from use 
of a criterion of informed and educated desire.  
 While Nussbaum does carefully apply a criterion—what constitutes a decent 
human life?—it remains somewhat vague and its application intuitive. Her preference 
for the Mosaic length of ten makes the resulting list a little contrived. In contrast, Doyal 
& Gough’s A Theory of Need (1991) uses sharper criteria—first, what are the 
requirements for physical and mental health and for autonomy of agency? and second, 
what are those for higher levels of flourishing, including critical autonomy?—and a 
more explicit and structured method of application, which proceeds back down a chain 
of causation from desirable functionings to required capabilities to commodity 
characteristics to specific satisfiers to implied societal preconditions (see also Gough 
2000, 2013; Gasper 1996). Nussbaum lacks this structure and thus her list becomes a 
more personal selection of priorities from across several of these levels.    
 So, Nussbaum’s work can be seen as justifying a bill of rights; but is less 
rigorous and elaborated than Doyal and Gough’s parallel work, which corroborates but 
upgrades the approach behind her list. Why then has Nussbaum’s work had more 
attention and impact? Part of the reason is that Nussbaum more strongly embeds her 
means of prioritization into a larger humanistic project. While her prioritization 
methods may be less refined, she has elaborated additional methods which address 
much else of what we require in human development ethics, as we will see later. 
 The theory needs refinement in some other respects too. Any theory faces 
difficult boundary cases. Nussbaum’s requires qualification for cases beyond its core 
focus of the adult householder citizen, such as the seriously disabled or ‘differently 
abled’ for whom some capabilities are out of reach (see Nussbaum 2006); and for the 
half of humankind who are children or infirm. Nussbaum provides some of these 
qualifications, in a practical style enriched by her legal studies. She considers the case 
of religious celibates, who seem to reject that ‘it is always rational to want [all the 
specified core human capabilities] whatever else one wants’ (2000a:88); and argues 
that they rationally would want the sexual and other opportunities whose use they 
reject, for only thus does their sexual and other abstinence acquire meaning. Many 
hermits may disagree. She argues that hermits in fact seek affiliation to others, by 
praying for others or indirectly promoting universal spiritual upliftment. But some 
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hermits seek no societal affiliation, no human betterment, only an affiliation to some 
notion of the divine.  
 Nussbaum has here two ways forward open to her, not mutually exclusive. She 
could take the main path followed by Doyal & Gough: establishing and promoting the 
needs implied by a more restricted, sharper normative criterion. She can then avoid 
insisting that hermits want or logically should want sexual opportunities. Secondly, if 
she wishes to continue to work with the more extensive and vaguer criterion of human 
decency or dignity—less extensive and vague than the ‘good life’ criterion expounded 
in her early 1990s work but still not likely to give a tidy list of ten—then the theory 
requires fuzzier specification. The international human rights tradition and the global 
ethics movement of Hans Küng and others help to convey how a fuzzy theory can still 
valuably structure ongoing areas of debate, guide choices, and respect and face 
differences. Nussbaum already identifies two of her central capabilities—affiliation and 
practical reason—as more central than others; and comparably there can be some 
marginal cases and the list will have no sharp end point. Some of the proposed priority 
capabilities might be better seen as important desiderata than as absolute requirements 
(Crocker 1995; Gasper 1997). In this second option the list could be presented as an 
exemplar of a methodology which offers a framework for dialogical investigation and 
practical specification (cf. Alkire 2002). Otherwise it arouses fears in some people of a 
preemptive bid to capture the ear of metropolitan power-holders.  
 A list should be theorized and relativized by identifying and highlighting the 
roles it is meant to serve. Nussbaum has argued that a list is important not only as a 
counterweight to power in distribution processes within an established political 
community, but also more generally promotes sympathetic recognition of and attention 
to other humans. If we see the list as a method, or part of a method or family of 
methods within an approach, then we can think about its functions and then about how 
to construct and use it. The list is a means not an end; if we focus on the ends we can 
sometimes find suitable alternative or supplementary or modified means. The many 
valuable aspects in the overall capabilities approach should not be obscured by 
reduction of the approach to a quest for one specification of this one element. 
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Roles and methods 
 
Roles more broadly 
 A conscious role of Sen’s capability approach is to increase the range of types 
of information which we use, in order to provide a more adequate evaluative 
accounting. He later highlighted a second role: to provide underpinnings for 
conceptions of human rights. Nussbaum shares these aims. She highlights too a sister to 
the role of mobilizing more relevant information, namely: to provide a relevant 
language to express people’s own multi-faceted concerns better than do measures of 
income and utility (2000b: 138-9). Next, the evaluative accounter, not merely his 
present accounting, can be affected by the choice of language. Two more roles of 
Nussbaum’s approach are thus: to make observers more open, through this enriched 
perception of the content of lives; and, it is hoped, to build sympathy and commitment. 
Imaginatively ‘standing in other people’s shoes’ can change you, not only your 
information set. 
 Nussbaum—who was an actress in an early stage of her career—is more 
conscious or explicit than Sen about these later roles. While Sen rightly points out that 
goodwill exists, contrary to the assumptions and influence of much economics, he 
considers less the methods by which it might be fostered and defended. Yet it often 
exists only as a thing of rags and tatters. He has advanced a hypothesis that public 
information in a democracy prevents famines, but this presumes that the informed 
majority will care about a threatened minority. The hypothesis therefore fails in some 
cases intra-nationally, as well as of course inter-nationally.  
 Table 4 extends our comparison of Sen and Nussbaum into these areas of roles 
and methods. It uses the criteria which we mentioned earlier.  
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Table 4: Final two parts of a comparison of the capability(ies) ethics of Sen and Nussbaum 
D. ROLES SEN NUSSBAUM 
Multi-modal 
(witness, theory, 
policy) 
Yes. A source of his effectiveness Yes; her policy orientation has 
grown, with a distinctive focus on 
fundamental entitlements and 
constitutional principles  
To direct attention to 
a wide range of 
information and 
make observers 
more open 
Yes Yes; even more so than Sen 
To provide a 
language to express 
people’s concerns 
Less so More so 
To help build 
observers’ concern 
and sympathy;  
including globally 
Yes, though this has received less 
emphasis than the knowledge 
roles of having a wider range of 
information 
Yes, more than in Sen. To build 
sensitivity both for persons and for 
particular aspects of life. 
Explicitly cosmopolitan, universal 
To provide a basis 
for action 
Effective with audiences who are 
already committed. Limited with 
others? 
Greater attention than Sen to the 
motivational requirements for 
action  
Action on what? 
Consumerism? 
Is consumerism discussed? (‘he 
sidelines how the acquisition of 
commodities can sometimes be at 
the cost of much human freedom’, 
Gasper 2000b: 996) 
Attention to consumerism is 
readily compatible with 
Nussbaum’s richer picture of 
human needs and motives 
 
E. ON METHOD   
Way of looking Broad informational base, plus 
vivid illustrations 
A way of looking with openness 
and concern 
Range of types of 
evidence 
Mostly official statistics and 
historiography. 
Some use of testimony and 
personal witness, and of 
mythology 
A wider range of evidence, 
including richer sources – fiction, 
poetry, biography and 
autobiography, now sometimes 
also interviews, direct observation  
Way of 
understanding 
Humane social scientist A deeper way of understanding, 
using richer pictures of self, mind, 
emotions and language 
Style of presentation Humane committed social 
scientist 
A richer style of presentation, that 
explores the human content of 
evidence, including its emotional 
content, to build concern and 
commitment 
Type of cases Often uses artificial cases, 
simplified ‘situations’ 
Rich cases, often real cases 
Rhetorical 
repertoire (logos, 
pathos, ethos) 
Attends to and is effective in all 
three of these rhetorical 
dimensions; including by adapting 
his style for different audiences. 
This is an important source of his 
influence, including in analytic 
philosophy and economics. 
Attends powerfully to each aspect, 
but with occasional lapses in 
ethos.  
Has great power for some 
audiences, but lesser access, 
credibility or meaningfulness to 
most economists. 
 17  
Methods, in relation to purposes 
 While Nussbaum’s works from Sex and Social Justice (1999) onwards clarify 
the objectives of her capabilities approach, its foreground components and their 
justification, her special strengths of methodological richness and in conceptualisation 
of personhood are longerstanding. They deserve equal or greater attention in discussing 
her approach to human development, and have changed much less since the mid 1990s. 
 The method components overlap and mutually reinforce each other, but each 
deserves separate specification, as in Table 4. A broad informational base and rich 
detail in presentation can contribute to empathy, being able to understand others’ 
feelings; and to sympathy, seeing with concern, caring. However: ‘Whether such 
empathy will promote compassion on the part of insiders or outsiders…will depend on 
our judgements of seriousness, responsibility, and appropriate concern’ (Nussbaum 
2001a: 440). And whether compassion leads to caring action depends also on will, and 
on views about transjurisdictional duties and the respective roles of different bodies.  
 Nussbaum’s universalistic language focuses on what we share as human beings: 
it aims to give respect to what deserves respect, not to morally irrelevant features like 
(typically) race and gender and (sometimes) nationality. Her modulated 
cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum 1994, 2006), in which she advocates concentric circles of 
decreasingly intense affiliation, is linked to her method. To look at the detailed contents 
of people’s lives is considered a way of strengthening not just recognition of what we 
share behind the circumstantial details but also the emotional acceptance of this shared 
humanity. 
 What is the relationship between stages, purposes and methods in Sen and 
Nussbaum’s work? Table 5 elaborates upon the picture of possible purposes given in 
Figure 4’s ‘multi-modal’ row (witness, theory, policy), while using the abbreviated 
classification of stages in ethics: exposure and induction; theorization; and prescribing 
for action. It then indicates how even upon the same stage the two approaches differ, 
reflecting their creators’ different disciplines and background perspectives. Sen’s 
central focus is as a theorist, whose work is enriched by and enriches empirical 
observation and policy analysis (Gasper 2008). Nussbaum’s list is an attempt to ensure 
that such empirical and policy work attends to key dimensions of human existence. Her 
methodology centres on detailed reflection on ‘life-size’ cases which involve 
recognizably real people, whether truly real or literary creations. In the Aristotelian 
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tradition such extended treatment of cases is held to foster ethical discernment 
(Nussbaum 1999b). Her work across the three stages is not tri-partite: her reflection on 
a case often spans all three. And her methods include close textual analysis, with all the 
surprises and learning that this can generate. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Sen and Nussbaum’s attention to stages and cases 
 
 SEN NUSSBAUM 
FIRST STAGE 
Exposure to 
experience  
High attention by economics 
standards; still low for humanities. 
Compared to previous welfare 
economics, his capability 
approach leads one to consider the 
substantive contents of lives.  
Considers anecdotes and 
situations (Gasper 2000a). 
Much more attention than in Sen, 
including to thoughts, intentions, 
feelings, life-histories, and thus to 
particularized individuals as well 
as selected functionings. 
 
Considers histories and rich 
fiction (Gasper 2000a). 
SECOND STAGE 
Theorization  
Intensive formal analysis of 
somewhat simplified, abstracted 
situations, often imagined ones 
Theorizing here is less separated 
from the study of cases. Gives 
substantial but less detailed 
attention than Sen to formal 
analysis; has less apparatus for 
doing such analysis. 
THIRD STAGE 
Prescribing for 
action 
Substantial attention, especially 
jointly with Jean Dreze (see 
Gasper 2008, 2009) 
As intensive as Sen, but with a 
different focus: on individual legal 
cases, specific legislation and 
legal constitutions  
 
The stylized comparison above of Sen and Nussbaum has brought out in particular that 
Nussbaum’s approach contains not only arguments against ethical relativism and for a 
universal priorities list, but has a range of purposes and corresponding methods which 
demand examination as central to her project. The second half of the paper explores 
this agenda, and discusses how Nussbaum uses her declared methods. 
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3.  NUSSBAUM AND ETHICS METHODOLOGY: OF STORIES AND EMOTIONS 
 
Nussbaum advocates a wide but focussed vision that covers key aspects of people’s 
lives and sustains attention to the human significance of evidence, including its 
emotional content. She proposes empathy and shows how it links to compassion. In all 
these respects she in large part does what she advocates. But one also encounters 
repeatedly expressed dissatisfactions with her range of evidence, range of interlocutors, 
and style of debate.  
 A full discussion would assess each of Nussbaum’s proposals on method, 
including in relation to her purposes, and assess her practice against her theories. We 
would look at her investigation of emotions less comforting than sympathy, but equally 
fundamental: fear, disgust and shame. Here we must be selective. We will consider her 
examination and application of the key emotion of compassion, and her use of rich 
human narratives; the extent of her intellectual sources, including her relatively limited 
field exposure and collaborations; and an occasionally still over-confrontational 
argumentative style. 
 
Sympathy and commitment, compassion and mercy 
 
An enormous virtue of Nussbaum’s work lies in its attention to emotions, including to 
their roles in ethical judgement and ethical action. She considers too their dangers, 
distortions and determinants. Emotions figure as central capability no.5 in her list 
(2011: 33-4), and are involved in items 7-9: affiliation, play, and relations with other 
species.
6
 To describe and explain, and to persuade and act effectively, we need to 
understand, employ and influence much besides ‘utility’ and ‘preference’. Not least, we 
need more attention to the realms of care, besides the realms of freedom and of justice 
(van Staveren 2001), and to issues touched on by Sen in the 1970s under the labels 
‘sympathy’ and ‘commitment’ (Sen 2005; Gasper 2007b). Nussbaum has gone much 
further in this direction, drawing on wider sources. 
 Sen stressed the presence and importance of motives other than self-interest. In 
his usage, ‘sympathy’ meant felt satisfaction which is derived from seeing or 
                                                 
6
 Nussbaum sometimes defines emotions too narrowly: as related to things outside a person’s control 
which have great importance for the person’s own flourishing (2001a: 4, 22). Our own goals and our own 
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contributing to the well-being of others; and ‘commitment’ meant the willingness to act 
towards goals other than the agent’s own well-being, including the well-being of others, 
even though this will not raise and might diminish the agent’s well-being. Sen’s 
distinctions perhaps still reflected the mould of utilitarianism: only one type of felt 
satisfaction was recognized. A concern for others which did not make the agent happy 
was then not seen as sympathy, even though the word’s parts (sym-pathy) suggest 
feeling-with. ‘Commitment’ remained a disconnected, somewhat mysterious category. 
Nussbaum points out that ‘one cannot fully articulate Sen’s own more complex 
predictive and normative theory of reasoning without prominently including the 
emotions in which parts of that reasoning are embodied’ (2001a: 392). 
 Compassion (Nussbaum’s preferred term for sympathy) has a central role in 
moral, and thus all social, life. While Elster’s treatise on the emotions mentions it only 
briefly (1999: 68-70), as pity, Nussbaum examines it on an appropriate scale. ‘…a basic 
sort of compassion for suffering individuals, built on meanings learnt in childhood’ 
appears virtually universal and quasi-natural, and often survives even massive 
counterforces of ideology and socialization (2001a: 389). ‘By contrast, an abstract 
moral theory uninhabited by those connections of imagination and sympathy can easily 
be turned to evil ends, because its human meaning is unclear’ (pp. 389-90). Emotion is 
certainly not a sufficient guide in ethics, she emphasizes, but it is a necessary 
component; and emotions can be educated. 
 Nussbaum distinguishes empathy, the ability to imagine the experience of 
another person, from compassion, seen as concern (‘a painful emotion’) ‘at another 
person’s undeserved misfortune’ (2001a: 301). She takes sympathy to be coterminous 
with compassion, or a mild version of it; and avoids the term pity, deeming it now 
tainted by condescension. Aristotle described compassion as concern for the misfortune 
of another person, arising when that misfortune is seen by the observer as (1) major, (2) 
undeserved, and (3) of a type which could happen to himself. Nussbaum endorses the 
first two posited parts, but gives good reasons to consider the third a relevant 
contributory factor but not a necessary feature. She replaces it with (3*): the misfortune 
happens to someone (or some being) who figures within the observer’s universe of 
concern. The re-specification seems meant as an empirical description; it is not argued 
like a typical definition, in terms of convention, etymology or logic, but on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                              
flourishing must be distinguished, Sen would say; for we can sacrifice ourselves for others and for ideals. 
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cases of real or imagined feelings. The diagnosis helps Nussbaum find impediments to 
compassion: fear of acquiring duties to help (2001b: xxxvii); and envy, shame and 
disgust, which belittle others’ sufferings or exclude them from one’s universe of 
concern (2001a: 423). It also implies ways to try to promote appropriate compassion, 
by spreading more adequate theories of (1) ethical importance, (2) causation and desert, 
and (3) the scope of ethical community.   
  We can question Aristotle’s second component too, the idea that compassion 
does not apply to deserved misfortune. In this case the component is stipulated by 
Nussbaum as part of her definition, but that seems to exceed most ordinary usage. The 
term ‘compassion’—to feel with or for another’s suffering; ‘pity inclining one to help 
or be merciful’ (Oxford Dictionary)—does not by etymology or convention imply that 
the suffering must be undeserved (see also Comte-Sponville 2002: 106 ff.), though that 
is certainly a reinforcing factor, as in the case of children in very poor countries. 
Nussbaum refines her stipulation in two important ways: if the misfortune is excessive 
compared to the misdemeanour, or if the misdemeanour is related to factors beyond the 
agent’s control, then compassion can arise.  
 Compassion is for a victim, mercy is for a culprit, says Nussbaum. Mercy is 
benevolence toward a culpable but partly condonable wrong-doer. But in effect we can 
extend compassion to a culprit if we see damage which he has earlier suffered. He may 
be held only partially blameworthy, and hence deserving compassion if he has been 
punished as if fully responsible. In a fine essay on ‘Equity and Mercy’ (1999a: Ch.6) 
Nussbaum relates mercy to an attention to the particular circumstances and detailed 
histories of persons, such as provided in rich, realistic novels, depth journalism and 
humanistic anthropology. We come to see the forces, complexities and chances, often 
beyond the control of individuals, which contribute to misfortunes and misdemeanours. 
Whether one factor forms grounds for mitigation or for the opposite depends on its 
combination with the other factors, so: ‘Telling the whole story, with all the particulars, 
is the only way to get at that’ (1999a: 177). Further, punishment is not determined 
exclusively by the degree of mitigation, but also by concerns like deterrence and the 
other effects and costs; and compassion does not logically imply that we must act to 
remedy a situation, for that depends also on the likely effects and costs of the attempt. 
The implication is that we may not need to be so wary of feeling compassion. We can 
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show compassion to those whom we consider in error. Her explorations of imaginative 
literature help to show how. 
 
Ethical insights from thick-textured humanist narratives  
 
In Poetic Justice Nussbaum memorably argues that: 
a novel like [Dickens’s] Hard Times is a paradigm of such [needs/capabilities based] 
assessment [of people’s quality of life]. Presenting the life of a population with a rich 
variety of qualitative distinctions, and complex individual descriptions of functioning 
and impediments to functioning, using a general notion of human need and human 
functioning in a highly concrete context, it provides the sort of information required to 
assess quality of life, and involves its reader in the task of making the assessment 
(Nussbaum 1995c: 52). 
 
The novel Hard Times is shown to have both a critical and a constructive role. It brings 
to life, in the person of Gradgrind, a narrow perspective from routine economic 
thought, that insists that ordinary people’s motives are simple, self-interest alone, and 
that everything important can be measured, compared and aggregated in a single 
calculation which establishes a tidy correct solution. The novel refutes that perspective, 
through Gradgrind’s story and that of his family. Thus what is called ‘sophisticated 
economics of the Gradgrind sort is a bad novel’ (1995c: 34): it tells poor (inaccurate, 
unreliable, misleading) stories and is potentially useful only when it makes clear that it 
is a reductionist, as-if, exercise. 
 Constructively, good novels like Hard Times do the following, Nussbaum 
shows:  
 They present ‘a style of human relating in which…moral attitudes are made more 
generous by the play of the imagination’ (1998: 234), thus contributing to a habit of 
considering that the other ‘has a complex inner life, in some ways mysterious, in 
some ways like [one’s] own’ (1995c: 38). This reaching behind surfaces contributes 
to more adequate explanations of life and to better societies. Lack of such 
imaginative entry to others’ minds brings ‘psychological narcissism, of citizens 
who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human 
significance of the issues at stake’ (2001a: 426). 
 They show the joy and value of some things – including play and fun – in 
themselves, not merely as items for use. 
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 They cross the boundaries between cultures: ‘works of imaginative literature are 
frequently far more supple and versatile [tools] across cultural boundaries than are 
philosophical treatises with their time-bound and culture-bound terms of art, their 
frequent lack of engagement with common hopes and fears’ (1998: 242). 
 They promote a shareable perspective on ‘the human being’: a recognition of 
‘human needs that transcend boundaries of time, place, class, religion and ethnicity, 
and [make] the focus of [our] moral deliberation the question of their adequate 
fulfilment’ (1995c: 45); and that thus embody ‘the Enlightenment ideal of the 
equality and dignity of all human life, not of uncritical traditionalism’ (1995c: 46). 
 At the same time, they insist on the ‘diverse concreteness’ (1995c: 20) of 
‘deliberating subjects’ (p.34), ‘the complexity of the lives of individuals and the 
salience of individual differences’ (p.34). ‘A story of human life quality, without 
stories of individual human actors, would…be too indeterminate to show how 
resources actually work in promoting various types of human functioning’ (p.71). 
In sum, Nussbaum claims that imaginative literature ‘provides insights that should play 
a role (though not as uncriticized foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral 
and political theory; second, that it develops moral capacities without which citizens 
will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or 
political theory, however excellent’ (1995c: 12). It can, not least, ‘contribute to the 
dismantling of the stereotypes that support group hatred’ (p. 92). 
 Some literary theorists suggest that imaginative literature is potentially uniquely 
good in these roles. They see ‘literature as a distinctive mode of thought about being 
human’ (Haines 1998: 21). Whether ‘literature’ extends beyond novels, poems and 
plays, to essays, biography, travelogues and literary criticism, is debated. For 
development ethics, real narratives are vitally important, probably even more so than 
fiction. Consider for example the impact of works of biography and autobiography 
from China, such as Wild Swans (Chang, 1991) and Son of the Revolution (Heng & 
Shapiro 1983). However Nussbaum’s main focus and that of much of the related 
discussion is on imaginative writing, with a claim that this has special features. It takes 
us into a variety of other minds, in ways that other forms—even perhaps poly-vocal 
reportage—may be less able to.  
 The thick language of literature ‘expresses our moral intuitions in a way that the 
“thin” language [of much philosophy] does not’, argues Parker (1998: 10), drawing on 
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Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. Restriction to the thin languages of philosophy 
leads us to talk about something else than our real moral thoughts. In reaction to the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries’ Wars of Religion in Europe, Enlightenment ethics chose to 
proceed with a conception of persons as individual reasoners only, neglecting their 
other features and capacities, even their processes of maturation as persons. ‘The 
abstract moral deliberator has no capacities that can be shown only through their 
development’, unlike in the richer moral psychology seen in the Bildungsroman 
(Diamond 1998: 52). Various philosophers now make such points at a general level. 
Nussbaum is ‘a distinguished exception’ in providing also in-depth readings of 
literature, remarks Haines (1998: 30). This adds weight to her view on whether 
imaginative literature can be a substitute for philosophical ethics. She concludes rather 
that the two provide complementary ways of thinking ethically and that literary 
criticism mediates between the two (Haines, p.32). 
 Pictures provide a sister route by which sympathy is aroused or withheld. 
Pictures have a special power but also a simplicity and, by virtue of the very openness 
and underspecification which can stimulate our imaginations, a proneness to distorted 
interpretation.  Our facility in mentally inventing scenarios often brings the danger that 
we think we understand when in fact we don’t (Becker 1998). Written accounts call 
forth images too but try to inform our interpretation more. Novels typically elaborate 
the linking scenarios more carefully, to ensure that we understand with more care and 
depth. They try to not just show a process in their characters, but to induce its 
counterpart in the reader. Building a sense of real people through evocative detail, 
recounting situations and events in which we could imagine ourselves, and drawing out 
their unforeseen consequences, can engage our sympathy for those described.  
 Wayne Booth argued in The Rhetoric of Fiction that sympathy ‘is technically 
produced and controlled by the devices of access, closeness and distance’ (Nair 2000: 
114). First: ‘We are more likely to sympathise with people when we have a lot of 
information about their inner lives, motivation, fears, etc.’ (p.110). This is the method 
eschewed by economics (and by pictures from afar), whose analyses strictly ration the 
requirements for both information and sympathy, following Sir Dennis Robertson’s 
premise that nothing is scarcer, relative to requirements, than love for one’s fellow man 
(Robertson 1956). Second: ‘We sympathise with people when we see other people who 
do not share our access to their inner lives [DG: e.g., sometimes external economists] 
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judging them harshly or incorrectly. In life we get this kind of information through 
intimacy and friendship. In fiction we get it through the narrator…or through direct 
access to the minds of the characters’ (pp. 110-11). Thirdly, ‘Information alone cannot 
necessarily elicit a sympathetic response. Sometimes it is the careful control of the flow 
of information, which controls a reader's judgement.’ (p.111). When a reader shares 
information that he knows one character has and another lacks, it tends to place him in 
the former’s shoes and on their side. A third person narrator may present events to us 
but through the protagonist’s eyes, thus making us see her with both distance and 
involvement. 
 Novels can cast particular light on how ‘the self comes into being as a dialogic 
process’ (Hillis Miller, cited by Parker 1998: 13), rather than being inherent like the 
kernel of a nut. Identity can be seen, says Nair, firstly as derived from the relationships 
between persons, ‘the system of differences through which individuality is constructed / 
structured’; and secondly ‘as a narrative. The only way to explain who we are is to tell 
our own story’ (Nair 2000: 109). This takes us beyond Sen’s picture of identity as 
simply multi-dimensional (Sen 2006), to reflect on how persons’ valuations in those 
dimensions arise and evolve within systems of social relationships which also evolve.  
 Nussbaum proposes that ‘there are some moral views which can be adequately 
expressed only through novels’, thanks to their scale and style of investigation 
(Diamond 1998: 39). The central moral payoff from novels is not only from following 
what the characters experience and how they choose, but, says Nussbaum, even more 
from following how the novelist reflects on this. The reflection comes not as formal 
general arguments; although those are what most philosophers search for from 
literature, often impervious to its ambiguities, warn Diamond, Nussbaum and others. 
Literature offers no propositional systems but builds our sensitivity and imagination – 
our heart and soul (Adamson 1998: 89). Philosophers in practical ethics sometimes use 
cases intensively, but only as illustrations, for building general classifications, 
guidelines and codes. To protect anonymity and to abstract sufficiently in order to try to 
establish general principles, they ‘routinely alter [cases’] setting and culture, supposing 
that this leaves the “essential” aspects of the case untouched’ (Wiltshire 1998: 188). 
Yet the particular details may be central to the meaning of the case. Wiltshire argues 
that given the situational specificity and complexity of cases, and the prevalence of 
vital aspects which are not tidily commensurable, we should not rely on general 
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rulebooks but on educated judgement based on deep immersion and the use of educated 
emotions. Personal narratives written by participants, for example those involved in 
‘complex emergencies’, can offer such immersion and education. They tell real 
histories, not anecdotes or reductive simplifications or momentary situation reports, 
with attention to the emotions involved and the context of whole lives. The narratives 
illustrate conflicting viewpoints, real time pressures, unforeseen events and undesired 
effects, and the transformation of perspectives in the face of extreme experiences 
(Wiltshire 1998: 188-9). They fulfil most of the functions which Nussbaum identifies 
as required in ethics, and with more realism than in nearly all fiction. Her own work 
presents various narratives, real and fictional, which essay these tasks. 
 Adamson fears that Nussbaum is overly prone to impose a lucid order, find a 
ready answer, rather than sometimes live with indeterminacy. Nussbaum repeatedly 
declares she is open to that  (e.g., 2001b: 14), and insists that a literary work be read as 
a whole, not dipped into for selected illustrations. Literature maintains our awareness 
that there is more in life than we know or understand, whereas so much ethics is 
narrowly, overconfidently knowing (Diamond 1998: 51). So, literature can help build 
sensitivity and imagination, as well as help us to respond and act (e.g., Nussbaum 
2001b: xvii, Ch.7). It can generate questions, perception of possibilities and, says 
Adamson, a sense of people’s lives—rather than by itself give answers to ‘How should 
we live?’, let alone a full and adequate general conception of ‘Life’ (1998: 104). 
Nussbaum concurs.  
 
4 – CAVEATS: ETHOS, COMPASSION, BUILDING A RESEARCH MOVEMENT 
 
Range of sources 
 
Sen, Nussbaum and the UN Human Development Reports conclude that not all things 
of major importance are commensurable, neither when we think of life as a whole nor 
when we discuss public policy. We therefore need to evaluate by using diverse sets of 
information. Nussbaum goes further, since alongside evaluation she adds purposes of 
explanation and persuasion. She mobilizes a range of types of material in addition to 
those conventional in philosophy and economics. Her longstanding and enlightening 
examination of imaginative literature—classical Greek, Hellenistic, Roman and modern 
 27  
European—has steadily extended to cover less exclusively Northern, bourgeois or 
fictional sources. She draws also from law and psychology, and thoughtfully treats the 
practical choices faced by judges and (other) policy-makers, including issues of 
balancing, feasibility and timing. Her post-1994 work has engaged much more with 
varied modern realities of livelihood and politics. Her limited but intense research trips 
to India in March 1997 and December 1998 influenced Women and Human 
Development strongly and are part of what has grown into a much more extensive 
engagement. 
 Both field visits to India were a matter of a few weeks: active, tightly 
programmed, but still a matter of weeks; the second occurred shortly before finalization 
of WHD’s Preface. ‘What was Kant’s or Rawls’s field exposure?’, and ‘Literature is the 
perfect substitute’, one might say in defence. Philosophers must primarily base 
themselves on the field studies done by others. But credibility and image problems arise 
for social philosophers of global human development if they work in isolation and 
without varied experience of the globe. How reliably can they interpret what they read? 
Credit goes to Nussbaum for exposing herself more directly. At the age of fifty she 
experienced ‘days that were different from any days I had ever spent’ (WHD, p.ix); but 
did not pause there to reflect on the possible impact of months, and years, of such 
exposure.  
 The extent and quality of one’s range of interlocutors is a vital potential 
compensation for the inevitable limits of one’s own experience. Nussbaum disciplines 
her ideas by reference to contemporary cases, the situations of ordinary people, and the 
views of colleagues from many countries, including a number in India, as well as to 
Proust, the Greek tragedies and Henry James. The balance remains somewhat towards a 
‘Northern highbrow’ mix. While she has added substantial, modern, non-European 
cases and coverage, in Women and Human Development those cases remained 
relatively few and in the style of literary cameos, indeed sometimes taken from 
literature (notably a story by Tagore). WHD makes intensive and good use of the cases 
of two modern Indian women - Vasanti in Ahmedabad, and Jayamma in Trivandrum. 
These cases open the book and are regularly referred to in its later stages (and again in 
Creative Capabilities). Yet they seem rather thin in number (two) and depth (perhaps 
even from single meetings reliant on interpreters) for Nussbaum’s ambitious purposes. 
Nussbaum promised a later fuller book, but appeared to have fuller theoretical coverage 
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in mind, not a much fuller experiential base or collaboration with a Southern author or 
authors. The Clash Within reflects several more years of involvement with India, but 
misses the benefit of an Indian co-author. The gaps here can be taken as spaces for 
further work by others, including both social scientists and philosophers, especially in 
cross-disciplinary and multi-national collaborations. 
 
Rhetorical strategy, tact and tactics  
 
Nussbaum reaches out to a variety of audiences through a variety of media—books and 
lectures, magazine articles and tv discussions—on a series of striking topics which she 
shows to be interconnected. Her rhetorical strengths include great lucidity sustained 
across extensive and intricate argumentation, exploration of emotions and meanings 
through use of a wide range of revealing examples, and evident intense reflection and 
sincerity.  
 In terms of reasoning, while Women and Human Development and Creating 
Capabilities explicitly do not present Nussbaum’s full philosophical defence of her 
approach, they buttress the approach in several ways. One is by comparison with 
theoretical alternatives, which strengthens audience confidence. For example WHD 
gives an impressive refutation of pure proceduralism, the idea that principles of justice 
can be established without any substantive ideas about the nature of the agents whom 
these principles are meant to concern (e.g., p.139). Conclusions could only be drawn by 
Rawls from his Original Position thought experiment by including ideas, open or often 
tacit, about the basic purposes or interests of the parties. WHD clarified the relationship 
of Nussbaum’s views to other theories too. It gives informed desire theory a subsidiary 
normative role, and shows in detail how closely it and her approach can converge on 
implications. 
 Another deepening of the approach, to some eyes and in terms of both argument 
and tone, comes in Nussbaum’s thorough and sympathetic response to the criticism that 
spiritual and religious aspirations were slighted in her previous accounts of central 
capabilities. She now highlights religion as a legitimate response to needs for 
expression, association, and affiliation (2001a: 419), while maintaining principled 
limits to the free exercise of religion; it is not to be free of reason, consistency, and 
humanity.  
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 One further strength is her practice sometimes of the style of ‘internal 
criticism’, expounded in a 1989 paper written jointly with Sen. They argued that the 
range of intellectual sources and resources within a culture provide bases for it to learn 
and evolve, including in response to influences from outside, rather than by demanding 
acceptance of ‘parachuted in’ external packages of ideas that may lack local resonance, 
relevance or acceptability. Commentators and critics are likely to have more influence 
if they build to a great extent on internal sources and resources. Hans Küng’s global 
ethics project offers a good example of how to build from within as well as without 
(Küng 1997). A parallel claim exists regarding discussion and criticism of intellectual 
schools and particular authors: that it is generally more effective for critics to take 
seriously the authors’ aspirations, projects and sincerity, and show how the aspirations 
can be better fulfilled by certain substitutions. Nussbaum’s recent books frequently 
practice this, and seek agreements on conclusions even where there is some 
disagreement on premises and routes. 
 Her late 1980s and early 1990s pieces on capabilities had relied heavily on an 
externally specified neo-Aristotelian vision of ‘the good life for man’, and met 
extensive resistance in some quarters. Inspired by passion, Nussbaum’s replies seemed 
occasionally distorted by it, further departing from the spirit of internal criticism. WHD 
helpfully proceeded more in that spirit, for example in Ch.3 on religion, where 
Nussbaum listens intently within a culture and builds upon its own moral tradition and 
categories. This is consistent too with adoption of a Rawlsian political liberalism, 
which provides space for various comprehensive ethics rather than trying to enforce 
any one, and extends her approach’s tool-kit and political relevance. At the same time 
Nussbaum notes the danger that internal discourse in tradition-based ethics can become 
ethnocentric reendorsement, and shows the need for external critical inputs.  
 In this difficult balancing act, aspects of Nussbaum’s tactics and tone can be 
questioned. She has sometimes ventured emphatic views on various Indian matters 
which she might understand insufficiently. In the course of her overall defence of 
people’s rights to form, have, and use opinions, and to be able to do so, she yet 
declares: ‘the nation is in no position to enforce either these laws [that mandate 
compulsory education] or laws against child labour at this time’ (2000a: 231), a 
statement that can be queried given what has been achieved in Sri Lanka, Kerala, and 
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elsewhere.
7
 Lack of crosschecking of details on India also significantly affects The Clash 
Within, potentially compromising its important message and ensuring that Nussbaum’s 
opponents will ignore that.
8
 
 
 
 Nussbaum appears sometimes overemphatic in her political judgements about a 
country she still knew relatively little. One respects, however, her project of internal 
criticism, that involves close reference to debates within India and the concepts and 
judgements which they presume, and her belief that traditions are more than a set of 
petrified practices and instead contain sub-traditions of reflection and the potential to 
evolve. Elsewhere in much of her work she is admirably thorough in letting us see 
analytical options and what is at stake.  
 When Nussbaum feels passionately that a particular view is not just mistaken 
about something important but actually dangerous, her eloquence has turned her 
prolific pen into a double-edged sword. Convinced of her cause, she sometimes leaves 
no prisoners; those declared guilty are publicly despatched, even in many published 
versions. A 1980s dispute with the Marglins was prominent in a 1992 article, a 1995 
book, and still in 1999’s Sex and Social Justice. A grey-material pamphlet by Veena 
Das from 1981 is impaled in that same book, and again in 2000 in Women and Human 
Development. In the ‘Professor of Parody’ case in New Republic during 1999, most of 
Nussbaum’s comments as reviewer seem well-argued and some of the reactions to them 
(collected in the issue of April 19th) misplaced or overheated; but there is overkill in 
her tone and some unnecessarily hurtful flourishes. These failings recur at points in the 
appropriately titled The Clash Within; for example, an intemperate attack on (the 
sometimes intemperate) Arun Shourie falls short in both empathy and compassion.
9
 
Nussbaum needs to maintain within her discursive circle scholars like Seyla Benhabib 
                                                 
7
 To mention briefly some other India examples from WHD which can affect authorial authority: 
Gandhianism is presented as the antithesis of the Western, although its founder spent twenty-five 
formative years in Britain and South Africa to return to India as a dedicated revolutionary (2000a: 67); 
page 27 cited 10,000 aborted Indian female fetuses p.a., a vast underestimate, and page 30 reported just two 
girls raped a day, in a nation of one billion. Similarly, from the 2011 book: school midday meals were 
pioneered in Tamil Nadu not Kerala (p.38). 
8
 Amongst the disconcerting inaccuracies that could have been avoided through use of a co-author, p. 96 
presents Vishnu and Rama as different and hostile deities (though Rama is an incarnation of Vishnu); p. 113 
states that Gandhi for a while gave support to Japan during World War Two (rather he withdrew his initial 
support for Britain); and p. 179 misidentifies politician George Fernandes as a BJP member. After giving the 
official data of a steady rise in the Muslim share of India’s population, page 203 declares: ‘So the idea that 
Muslims have been outstripping Hindus in their birthrate has no substance’. 
9
 Shourie’s work on religion did begin in the 1970s, including a 1979 book after his handicapped son was 
born in mid-decade. See Shourie’s 1982 biography written when he was awarded a Ramon Magsaysay 
award for journalism: http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/BiographyShourieAru.htm. 
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and Nancy Fraser, two of those who protested at the ‘Parody’ paper’s manner. Deirdre 
McCloskey and Arjo Klamer’s ‘The Rhetoric of Disagreement’ (1989) offers good 
advice, including a ‘Maxim of Presumed Seriousness’ in relation to those with whom 
one disagrees. We should not use the weaker possible formulations of our opponents’ 
views. And just as there are standard reasons for mercy and sympathetic mitigation, 
well expounded by Nussbaum, there are good reasons too for cool understatement in 
debating disagreements. 
  Nussbaum’s primary audience is North American, explicitly so in Cultivating 
Humanity or The Clash Within; implicitly in several other books’ lengthy discussions of 
US law cases and WHD’s style of periodic advice to Western feminists; and still so in 
Creating Capabilities.
10
 Especially if there are any conventions and imperatives in 
American public discourse which reward and motivate overstatement, one should 
remember a danger that some non-American audiences can stereotype ‘Americans’, as 
sometimes arrogant, naïve, dominating and overinfluential. American authors seeking a 
global audience have to counteract this. Most of Nussbaum’s work counters the danger 
with style and grace, but with occasional problem spots such as we mentioned. There is 
much to be learnt from Sen’s tactics and style, which contribute to his ability to 
mobilize collaborators and have influence through diverse research and policy networks 
(see Gasper 2000b). He takes care to identify common ground, to build and preserve a 
convincing ethos, to encourage others, and to collaborate and lead in joint work.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Martha Nussbaum’s already impressive contribution has been considerably broadened 
and deepened by her published work since the late 1990s, including advances in each of 
the aspects of persuasion—logos, pathos, ethos. Both Creating Capabilities and Women 
and Human Development, for example, give systematic and rewarding treatments of 
her capabilities approach; and Frontiers of Justice provides major extensions of the 
approach: for the disabled, across national boundaries, and for non human life.
11
 The 
books remain work in progress which leaves various issues requiring further attention. 
                                                 
10
 P.66 speaks of ‘Our Supreme Court’; and  ‘in this country’ refers to the USA (2011:16). 
11
 On Frontiers of Justice, see Gasper (2006). 
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The priority capabilities list, for example, can be upgraded with a framework such as 
Doyal and Gough’s or Alkire’s.  
 Nussbaum’s formulations on capabilities must be understood however as not 
just a priority list, but as a way of proceeding, a broad approach to ethics and human 
development. This paper has centred not on fine-tuning a list and details of the 
approach’s theory of the good, but on the roles of a list and the approach’s other 
components. We identified and considered major elements other than those which refer 
directly to capabilities: ideas about audiences and purposes, background concepts and 
values, including concepts of personhood and emotion, and the approach’s sources and 
methods for obtaining and interpreting materials. We considered how the choices of 
purpose, audience, and stage of work could influence the choices of methods and 
sources. 
 Various choices of audience and of the line and timespan of projected influence 
are legitimate. Nussbaum’s focus matches some essential arenas, purposes and 
audiences. She seeks longer run influence on constitutional and legal frameworks and 
on political culture, in order to buttress compassion, cosmopolitan concern and human 
rights. She aims to influence how people listen, see and act, and thus to change 
listeners, not only their information set. We saw for example that Sen’s hypothesis that 
a democracy will prevent famines relies on a degree of felt political community. If 
there is little such community, crippling shortage amongst marginal groups may not 
receive attention and concern in the national or even regional metropoli, let alone 
internationally. Given the extent and even growth of selfishness and narrow group-ism 
both globally and intra-nationally, for example in relation to climate change, 
Nussbaum’s attention to the bases of concern for others is highly relevant in policy 
ethics, not only in personal ethics. Her time horizon is consciously relatively long term, 
as reflected in her stress on upgrading of school and college education, not least in rich 
countries (1997, 2010). 
 We see then the pertinence of her focus on the analysis and education of 
emotions, especially compassion. Nussbaum connects the worlds of socio-economic 
and philosophical discussion of human development to these more intimate realms. For 
social and development policy, the emotion of compassion may be central, and 
Nussbaum provides a rich examination. She points out its vulnerability to narrowly 
defensive specifications of who is within the universe of moral consideration, of how 
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seriously they are or would be harmed by a situation, and of how far they are 
themselves to blame for it. However, one can doubt Nussbaum’s adoption of the 
Aristotelian conceptualization of compassion as necessarily or contingently arising only 
when a misfortune is undeserved. A non-desert criterion is relevant, but to make it 
essential may be questionable.  
 We can gratefully endorse Nussbaum’s advocacy of intent study of imaginative 
literature in order to examine and educate compassion and the emotions more 
generally, though with a proviso that the power of ‘Great Books’ for many audiences 
can be exaggerated. Questions remain about the balance between types of literature 
(fictional, historical, biographical, autobiographical etc.), and about how one might 
feasibly and effectively promote such study within the confines of education in social 
sciences and the professions, even in international development studies. We cannot 
look to Nussbaum for all these answers; it is an area that demands ongoing work (cf. 
Lewis et al., 2008).  
 Nussbaum’s enormous agenda brings a need for many types of evidence, 
collaboration and interaction. Perceptions of her own degrees of empathy, compassion, 
mercy and cosmopolitanism become important, especially given the frequency of 
reactions elsewhere against Americans from elite settings. In debate with those who 
differ, and in seeking to attract cooperators and fellow travellers, tact and tactics are 
vital. Nussbaum’s writings overall are impressively empathetic, compassionate, 
judicious, and merciful; but with some possible lapses, of commission (in disputes) and 
omission (in collaborations). We can learn from how effectively Sen has fostered a major 
research programme through building collegiality, networks and partnerships and through 
defusing resistance. He has attracted and kept the support or attention of a wide family 
of potential collaborators and potential users. 
 While it was useful to itemize and contrast the contents of Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s approaches, as was attempted here, neither approach is fixed and finished. 
The purpose of the comparison was to better understand what they say; to try to assist 
each of these sister programmes to improve; and to promote a well articulated 
connection and a productive and cooperative working relationship between them. We 
require a capability/capabilities/post-capabilities approach that transcends and outlives 
its founders, and that contributes effectively towards human development. 
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